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[L. .A. No. 22855. In Bank. Jan. 12, 1954.]

LAURA CUCINELLA et al., Appellants, v. WESTON
BISCUIT COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
Automobiles-Evidence~Speed.-In action for injuries sustained by ped€strian who was struck by automobile while
attempting to cross a highway at a place other than an intersection and not in a crosswalk, marked or unmarked, evidence
of average speed usually traveled by motorists on such highway was admissible as part of res gestae on issue of plaintiff's
contributory negligence there being other evidence that
plaintiff as well as defendant was familiar with area in which
accident occurred and that plaintiff was injured when she attempted to return to curb without loolring for traffic which
might be approaching.
[2] Appeal..:.....Right to Allege Error-Estoppel...:.....Plaintiff is not in
a position to complain on appeal that she was not permitted
to prove that she and others customarily crossed street at
point of accid€nt, that formerly a crosswalk had been marked
there, and that a marked crosswalk had been authorized at
that point, where an opportunity was provided her to prove
that a marked crosswalk formerly existed and her counsel
did not take advantage of such opportunity.
[3] Automobiles- Contributory Negligence- Persons Crossing
Streets.-Unless an authorized marked crosswalk is actually
marked, the fact that it has been authorized cannot affect
duties of persons using streets.
[ 4] Id.-Instrnctions-Amount and Degree of Caution Required.In action for 1njuries sustained by pedestrian who. was struck
by automobile while attempting to cross roadway, plaintiff's .requestea, instru(ltions that amount of caution required of driver
and p.edeji>trian may not be the same for eac]I, will. vary in
accordance. with nature of act and. surrounding eircumstanel)s,
and increases as (loes danger that I'easo11ably should be apprehended, .correctly stated the law; .but refusal to give them
did not constitute prejudicial error, where court at defendants'
request .instruflted . that it is the duty. of every person using
a public highway, whether a pedestrian or the driver of any
kind of vehicle, to use ordinary care to .avoid placing himself
or others in danger and to avoid a collision, that such duty

[11

(1) See Cal.Jur.id, .Automobiles, § 383 et seq.; .Am.Jur•.•. .Auto~
mobiles, §63Q.
MeK.. Dig. ~eferences: [1] .Automobiles., ~ 211; [2] .Appeal
and, Error, § 1088; [3] .Automobiles, § 129{1); .[4] 1\utomqbiles,
§§ 318, 343, 385-1.
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continues even when one has the right of way, and that law
a highway at a place other than
an intersection. and not in a crosswalk marked or unmarked,
to
of way to all vehicles on roadway so near as
to constitute an immediate hazard and amount of caution recare increases as does danger
person in like position would apwhere instruction on imminent peril was
to jury, and where jury was instructed fairly as
uno<cucur; of ordinary care and that if "any rule, direction
or idea"
been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon
was intended and that jury was to consider all instructions
as a whole.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Wilbur C. Curtis, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrian in
an automobile accident. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
William W. Waters and Henry F. Walker for Appellants.
Hunter & Liljestrom and Harold J. Hunter for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife,
appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict
in their action to recover damages resulting when plaintiff
an automobile while she was attempting
wife was struck
to walk across San :F'ernando Road in the city of Los Angeles.
We have concluded that no prejudicial error or miscarriage
of justice is shown and that the judgment should be affirmed.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.)
'fhe accident occurred about 9 :30 in the morning of April
25, 1950. 'l'he weather was clear and dry and visibility was
good. Plaintiff 1 had walked in an easterly direction halfway
across San Pernando Road, a north-south highway at the
point
some 24 feet south of its intersection with
r_.acy Street, and had paused at the double white line in the
center of the highway, waiting for traffic to "give me a
chance" to
the crossing. She testified that she
suddenly became frightened by an oncoming truck and, without looking further at
turned around in a clockwise
direction and
to return to the westerly curb from
which she had started. At a
8 or 9 feet from such
1
Unless otherwise stated the designation "plaintiff" refers to the
injured wife.

CucrNELLA

v.

WES'l'ON

[42 C.2d

BrscuiT Co.

73

265 P.2d 513]

automobile traveling south on
Pernando and driven
defendant Smith in the course
of his
defendant Weston Biscuit Company,
Plaintiff did not remember taking any steps after her
turn in the center of San
and the next she knew
was when she was
in bed in the hospital.
Defendant Smith testified that he
saw plaintiff when
80 feet away from the point at which she
to return to the curb; that he was then traveling
35 miles
and uo cars were ahead of him;
out into the center of the street and appeared
to take two or three
the center, then she whirled to
her
and ran back towards the west curb . . . in apa
line." Defendant was startled and
"slammed on my brakes." He continued "to hold the brakes
on" until his car
and stated he was going approxi3 miles an hour when he struck plaintiff. Defendant's
tires "laid dmvn" 72 feet of "skid-marks" in the street,
from which an
witness computed that the minimum
"when it first started to lay down
skid-marks"
miles an hour.
'l'he drivers of tvvo cars which were traveling immediately
behind defendant and in the same (right hand or "curb")
lane of traffic both testified that all three cars were traveling
30 to 35 miles an hour, and both drivers saw
turn to her right in the center of San
.B'ernando and start to rnn back in a straight line to the curb.
One of the drivers testified that "There was a lot of heavy
traffic . . . there on San Fernando Road that morning.''
Other evidence established that morning traffic on San Fernando is "
'
the period from 8 to 10 o'clock.
Plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the trial
court erred in
evidence of the "average speed"
the area of the accident, in the face
a
officer working in the area that San
Fernando
with 25-mile-an-hour speed limit
at
1% miles north and 11;4
miles south of
Street intersection. On crossexamination
counsel for defendant the officer was permitted to also
over objection by plaintiff, that he
would ''estimate'' that ''the average speed usually traveled
at that time
motorists" was "about 30 miles an hour
along there.'' Other evidence in the record discloses that
for some five years immediately preceding the accident
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plaintiff had been intermittently employed in a laundry
at the San Fernando and Lacy intersection, and that defendant drove ''up and down San Fernando'' on an average of several times a week and thus was also familiar
with the area in which the accident occurred. Plaintiff's
arguments appear to be predicated upon the assumption that
the evidence as to average speed of traffic in the area was
offered by defendant solely to excuse his own conduct in
driving at a rate admittedly in excess of the posted limits.
However, as in Fowler v. Key System Transit Lines (1951),
37 Cal.2d 65, 68 [230 P.2d 339], defendant pleaded that plaintiff was herself guilty of negligence proximately contributing
to her injuries. Under such circumstances and in view of the
undisputed fact that plaintiff attempted to return to the curb
without looking for traffic which might be approaching, it
appears that here, as in the Fowler case, the evidence of
custom bore on the issue of contributory negligence and was
''admissible as a part of the res gestae for the purpose of
giving to the jury full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances which existed at the time and place of the accident, which were known to the parties, so as to permit the jury
to pass upon the question of whether plaintiff conducted himself as an ordinary and reasonable person would have conducted himself in the light of all of the circumstances.''
(frinir v. Cheney Bms. (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 55, 63 [148
P.2d138], quoted at page 69 of Fowler v. Key System Transit
Lines, supra.)
[2] Plaintiff next urges error in the trial court's refusal
to permit her to prove that during her employment by the
laundry she as well as other laundry employes had customarily crossed San Fernando at the point here in question,
that formerly a crosswalk had been marked there with white
lines, and that a marked crosswalk had been authorized and
directed at the point by "competent city authority." However, other testimony showed that between 125 and150 pedestrians crossed San Fernando Road daily at the point between
7 a. m. and 6 p. m., that some six months prior to the accident
San Fernando Road had been resurfaced, and that at the
time of the accident two rows of metal buttons extended
out from the west curb some 7 to 12 feet into the roadway
which was 56 feet wide. Moreover, following objection by
defendant's counsel to a question put by plaintiff's attorney
as to how far the buttons extended out into San Fernando
before it was resurfaced, and the attorney's statement that
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the witness would answer that the ''metal markers extended
completely across the street," the court ruled that "I will
permit you to ask him if the buttons had previously gone
across the street, or had at the time it was re-surfaced . . . ''
Although the record does not indicate that plaintiff's counsel
thereafter took advantage of the court's ruling, it is apparent
that plaintiff is not in a position to complain, since opportunity was thus provided her to prove that a marked crosswalk formerly existed. Plaintiff cites no authority and none
has been discovered supporting her claim that although a
crosswalk actually was not marked at the time of the accident
and had not been during the previous six months, she should
have been permitted to prove that a marked crosswalk had
been authorized and directed by ''competent city authority.''
On the record we perceive no error in the ruling. [3] Unless
an authorized marked crosswalk is actually marked the mere
fact that it has been authorized cannot affect the duties of
persons using· the street.
[ 4] Finally, plaintiff contends that error prejudicial to
her case resulted from the court's refusal to give the following two instructions requested by plaintiff by number (Nos.
201-E and 102-A; see paragraph (a) of Rule 16, Rules for
Superior Courts, 33 Cal.2d 7) from "California Jury Instructions, Civil":
No. 201-E: "While it is the duty of both the driver of a
motor vehicle and a pedestrian, using a public roadway, to
exercise ordinary care, that duty does not require necessarily
the same amo1mt 2 of caution from each. The driver of a
motor vehicle, when ordinarily careful, will be alertly conscious of the fact that he is in charge of a machine capable
2
0riginally instruction No. 201-E used the word "degree" instead of
amount.'' 'l'he inaccuracy of saying that a different ''degree of care''
may be exacted of the driver of an automobile as compared with a
pedestrian is forcefully pointed out in Lasater v. Oakland Scavenger Co.
(1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 217, 221 [162 P.2d 486]. As stated by the court
there, "'rhe decedent was struck by a truck while crossing a street in
the darkness. Appellants proposed an instruction that by reason of the
fact that she was dressed entirely in black she should have used 'a greater
dPgree of care' for her own safety. The instruction wns erroneous in
using the word 1 degree' insterrd of 'qmwtum' or 'amount.' The degree
of cm·e required of a person for his own safety is always the same,
i.e .• ordinary care, although in some circumstances the quantum OT amount
of care required to reach the degree of ordinary care is greater than in
others.''
In 19;"i0 instruc"tion No. 201-E was amended hy substituting tho word
''amount'' for the word ''degree.'' Inasmuch as this tYial took place
in 1952, plaintiff must be considered to have requested the instruction
as it reads subsequent to the 1950 amendment.
11
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of projecting into serious consequences any
of his
own. Thus his caution must be
to that responsibility as related to all the
circumstances. A
pedestrian, on the other
his own physical
body to manage and with which to set in motion a cause of
injury. While, usually, that fact limits his
to cause
injury, as compared with a vehicle
ordinary care, he, too, will be
chanical power acting, or that may
roadway,
and of the possible, serious consequences from any conflict
between himself and such forces. And the caution required
of him is measured
the
of
to
him in the conditions at hand, or
to
a person of ordinary prudence in the same
No. 102-A.: "Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by
the ordinary prudent person varies in direct
to
the danger kno·wn to be involved in his
it follows
that in the exercise of
care the amount of caution
required will vary in accordance with the nature of the act
and the surrounding circumstances. To
the matter in
another way, the amount of caution
the law increases as does the danger that
should be apprehended.''
At defendants' request, the court did instruct as follows:
"It is the duty of every person
highway,
whether a pedestrian or the driver of any kind of vehicle,
to exercise ordinary care at all times
himself or others in danger and to avoid
''The law imposes upon tl-Je
any vehicle using
a public highway, and upon a
the same duty,
each to exercise ordinary care to
an accident
from which injury
result. 'rhis
continues even
when one has the right of way over the other . . . "
Concerning the duties of
to cross
a street, the court, at defendants'
included the following instructions: ""\Vhat observations he should make,
and what he should do for his own
while crossing the
e>ne>rr>n• to regulate
.,.,,,,...,,,"-r : it does
in detail and for all occasions,
place upon him the rHn>+i,nnim
to avoid an accident . . . ·while as
such as that involved in thi;;.: CDRe,
a right
to cross the road at any point, thc;;e factors of consideration
enter into the question of what conduct is ''"'"",...'"'"' of him
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J:I'irst: if he crosses at a
marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an
the law requires him to
the
to all vehicles on the roadway so near
as to constitute an immediate hazard. Second : the amount
to constitute ordinary care increases as
that a
prudent person, in like
in the situation. For example,
fast traffic, poor visibility, obstructions
these or any other perceivable factor inincreases the amount of caution which an
person would use.''
to the duties of the operator of a
motor vehicle the court instructed, among other things, that
''Section 671 of the Vehicle Code in effect at the time of
the accident
as follows: 'The driver of a motor
necessary to insure safe operation
vehicle when
with his horn. Such horn shall
shall give audible
not otherwise be used.'
"It will be noted that the law does not prescribe the
eircumstances under which a horn shall be used, but
that
shall be given when reasonably necessaTy to insure
. This means that the question whether
or not the horn should have been sounded in this case is a
question of fact for you to decide in the light of all the surrounding
the defendant's conduct
\vhat
have been expected of a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstances.
"The
at which a vehicle travels upon a highway,
considered as an isolated fact and simply in terms of 'so many
miles an hour, is not proof either of negligence or of the exercise of ordinary care.
"Whether that
is a negligent one is a question of
fact, the answer to which
on all the surrounding
circumstances.
''The basic
law of this state, as provided in Section
510 of the Vehicle
is as follows:
" 'No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a
greater than is reasonable or prudent, having due
regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the
and in no event at a speed which endangers the
safety of persons or property.'
"A violation of this basic rule is negligence.
"You are instructed that the Vehicle Code of the State
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of California, in full force and effect at the time of the accident, provided as follows:
'' 'Section 511. The speed of any vehicle upon a highway
not in excess of the limits specified in this section or established
as authorized in this code is lawful unless clearly proved
to be in violation of the basic rule declared in Section 510
hereof.
'' ''fhe prima facie limits referred to above are as follows
and the same shall be applicable unless changed as authorized
in this code, if so changed, then only when signs have been
erected giving notice thereof, in which event the speed desigmtted on the sign shall be the prima facie limit: Twenty-five
miles per hour.
'' ' ( 1) In a business or residence district.' . .
''Conduct which is in violation of any of the statutes just
read to you constitutes negligence per se. This means that
if the evidence supports a finding, and you do find, that a
person did so conduct himself, it requires a presumption that
he or she was negligent. However, such presumption is not
conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing
that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the
conduct in question was excusable, justifiable and such as
might reasonably have been expected from a person of ordinary prudence.''
A further instruction requested by defendants and given
1vas that ''the fact of having the right of way, if such be the
fact, [does not] excuse one from the exercise of ordinary
care to avoid causing an accident." At plaintiffs' request,
an instruction on imminent peril was also given. 3
The jury, midway in its deliberations, returned to the courtroom with a request that the instruction on imminent peril
be reread, and the court thereupon again read ''a group of
instructions which" the jury were again told "should be con3
The imminent peril instruction reads as follows:
''A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and
unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to others,
is not expected, nor required, to use the same judgment and prudence
that is required of him, in the cxereisc of ordinary care, in calmer and
more deliberate moments. His duty is to exercise only the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same situation. If
nt that moment he does whnt appears to him to be the best thing to do,
and if his choice and manner of action are the same as might have been
followed by any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions,
he does all tho law requires of him, although, in the light of after-events,
it should appear that a different course would have been better and
safer."
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sidered together," including among others the imminent peril
instruction and the instruction that "It is the duty of every
person using a public highway, whether a pedestrian or the
driver of any kind of vehicle, to exercise ordinary care at
all times to avoid placing himself or others in danger and to
avoid a collision'' and that the duty of exercising ordinary
care "continues even when one has the right of way over the
other."
Another instruction given (but not re-read to the jury)
was that even though a pedestrian is crossing outside a crosswalk and thus is obliged to yield the right of way to vehicles
on the roadway the vehicle driver is not thereby relieved
''from t~e duty to exercise due care for the safety of any
pedestrian upon a roadway.''
"Ordinary care" was defined to the jury as "that care
which persons of ordinary prudence exercise in the management of their own affairs in order to avoid injury to themselves or to others.''
It should be mentioned also that the court cautioned the
jury that "If in these instructions, any rule, direction or
idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me, and none mnst be inferred by you. For that
reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any
individual point or instruction, and ignore the others, but
you are to consider all the instructions and as a whole, and
to regard each in the light of all the others.''
Plaintiffs, in support of their contention that instruction
No. 201-E should have been given, rely upon Dawson v.
Lalanne (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 314 [70 P.2d1002], in which
a judgment in favor of defendant was reversed on the sole
ground of error in failing to instruct the jury that "the
plaintiff and the defendant were both chargeable only with
the exercise of ordinary care, but a greater amount of such
care was required of the defendant at the time of the accident in question by reason of the fact that he was driving
and operating an automobile, which is an instrumentality
capable of inflicting serious and often fatal injuries upon
others using the highway." The court there declared that
"This instruction clearly states the rule of law applicable
to the facts of the case and has been approved in a number
of cases," as follows: Weihe v. Rath.ien 1YIercantile Go. (1917),
34 Cal.App. 302 [167 P. 287]; Raymond v. Hill (1914), 168
Cal. 473, 483 [143 P. 743]; Vedder v. Bireley (1928), 92
Cal.App. 52 [267 P. 724]; Pinello v. Taylor (1933), 128
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Cal.App. 508, 514 [17 P.2c1
St(pra, numerous other cases have
couched in substantially the same
Crescent A1do Co.
) , 20
749]; B1·o1m v. Blair
),
P.2d 95]; iV!artin v. Vien·a
[93 P.2d 261]; McNem· v.
63 Cal.App.2d 11, 18-19
v. Curr·an
(1953), 116 Cal.App.2d
; Geisler
v. R1fgh (1937), 19
P.2d
; cf.
De Greek v. li1 reeman
645, 646 [291
P. 854]; Mor·gan v. Los
(1930), 105
Cal.App. 224, 231 [287 P.
) , and others have approved
the B.A.J.I. instruction No. 201-E which was here offered by
plaintiff (see Sclutlman v. Los
Corp. (1941),
44 Cal.App.2d122, 128 [111 P.2d
v. Stroh (1942),
54 Cal.App.2d183, 189
P.2cl
; O'Br1~en v. Schellberg
(1943), 59 Cal.App.2d
770
P.2d
).
It is apparent that the intent of the instructions approved
in the cited cases was to inform the
that the elements
of action constituting conduct which
ordinary
care are those commensurable with the
involved
and depend upon the character of the
used or the nature of the act w·hieh is
as related to the surrounding circumstances. If the particular
instruction here requested
201-E) had consisted of only the first sentence
which contains the
expression ''amount of caution,'' it
would have been
confusing to a jury. 'With the added
however,
set forth in the instruction, of the
of the quoted exduties of driver and of
pression as related to the
pedestrian the instruction as a whole
states the law
and explains that what is meant by
amounts of
caution is that the elements of conduct entering into ordinary
care or caution will vary and must be related to the particular
circumstances involved, including the character of the act
being performed. Both in the instruction
in Dawson
v. Lalanne ( 1937), snpm, 22
and in the
B.A.J.I. instruction here
the meaning
intended to be conveyed is the same. Another effort to ex, sup1·a,
press such meaning is found in Reed v. Stroh
54 Cal.App.2d 183, 189, stated as follows: "
instructions] require that both motorist and
exercise
ordinary care; that the driver must be conscious of operating
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an engine capable of immense and potential danger, and that
the pedestrian must be conscious of the fact that he is in the
midst of such dangers on the highway and guard against the
possibility of injury apparent to a careful, prudent person."
'l'ested by the standards above stated, and the circumstances of this case, instruction No. 201-E correctly states the
law and, as its subject matter was not specifically covered
by other instructions, it· should have been given. Before determining whether the failure to give such instruction was
prejudicial it is proper to recall that the trial court also
refused, as above mentioned, to give plaintiffs' requested
instruction No. 102-A, which states that the amount of caution
required of the ordinary prudent person increases as does
the danger that reasonably should be apprehended. Although
refusing to give No. 102-A, the court at defendants' request
instructed that ''·while . . . a pedestrian has a right to cross
the road at any point . . . the law requires him to yield the
right of way to all vehicles on the roadway so near as to
constitute an immediate hazard . . . [and] the amount of
caution required to constitute ordinary care increases as does
the danger that a reasonably prudent person, in like position,
would apprehend in the situation.''
In view of the seeming emphasis thus placed by some of
the instructions on the duties of the pedestrian, it is our view
that the court might well have given plaintiffs' requested
No. 102-A (which in its terms would apply to drivers as well
as pedestrians) as well as No. 201-E. Such emphasis, however, is at most a relative matter and is something the appearance of which cannot always be avoided; it comes not from
any misstatement of the law but from necessarily singling out
the pedestrian in order to state accurately and fully the law
applicable to any pedestrian under circumstances and in
situations described in the evidence. Other instructions which
in a like sense "emphasize" the duties of the operator of a
motor vehicle were given. Such instructions are designed
not to give unfair prominence to the obligations of the operator of a motor vehicle but to fully and fairly state the law
applicable to any vehicle operator in the circumstances and
situations described in the evidence. The fault in this case
is not one of af:firmative misstatement of any rule of law but
of failure to explain more fully that in the application of the
general rules of law which were correctly declared, the jury,
as a matter of law, as well as factually in using common sense,
good judgment and general knowledge, should recognize that
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the force of inertia of a heavy, fast moving vehicle is greater
than that of a comparatively light and slow moving pedestrian
and that the respectively ensuing potentialities of harm and
devolving responsibilities vary accordingly.
The close point in this case, if there is one, appears to us
to depend on the interpretation of plaintiff's own conduct
as established by her testimony. If such conduct can be
reconciled with the standards of ordinary care imposed on a
pedestrian crossing a roadway at a place other than an intersection or marked crosswalk it would seem to be on the theory
of sudden confrontation with imminent peril. As pointed
out above, the instruction on imminent peril was twice read to
the jury. So also, the jury were instructed fairly as to the
meaning of ordinary care and were cautioned that if ''any
rule, direction or idea" had been stated in varying ways, no
emphasis thereon was intended, ''none must be inferred by
you,'' and ''you are to consider all the instructions and as
a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others.''
The rule is that "No judgment shall be set aside . . . on
the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' ' 4 (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 4¥2; see, also, Loper v. JJiorrison (1944), 23 Cal.2d 600, 609
[145 P.2d 1]; People v. De La Roi (1944), 23 Cal.2d. 692, 703
[146 P.2d 225, 151 P.2d 837]; Speck v. Sarver (1942), 20
Cal.2d 585, 589 [128 P.2d 16]; People v. Honeyctdt (1946),
29 Cal.2d 52, 62 [172 P.2d 698]; People v. Sanchez (1947),
30 Cal.2d 560, 575 [184 P.2d 673] ; Delzell v. Day (1950),
36 Cal.2d 349, 351-352 [223 P.2d 625] ; Popejoy v. Hannon
( 1951), 37 Cal.2d 159, 169 [231 P .2d 484].) The burden is
on the appellant in every case to show that the claimed error
is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. (Vattghn v. Jonas (1948), 31 Cal.2d 586, 601 [191
P.2d 432] .) Consideration of the entire cause, including the
evidence as presented by the record, falls short of leading
us to the opinion that failure to give the two numbered in''For illustrations or definitions of what may constitute a miscarriage
of justice, see People v. Hall (1926), 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859];
People v. Putnam (1942), 20 Cal.2d 885, 892 [129 P.2d 367]; People v.
Rogers (1943), 22 Cal.2d 787, 807 [141 P.2d 722]; People v. Dail (1943),
22 Cal.2d 642, 6!)0 [140 P.2d 828]; Daniels v. City g. County of San
Ihancisco (1953), 40 Cal.2d 614, 624 [255 P.2d 785]; Delzell v. Day,
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 349, 351-352 [223 P.2d 625].
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structions has resulted in a miscarriage of justice; hence,
any error in refusing to give them does not appear to be prejudicial and does not justify reversal of the judgment.
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that it was prejudicial error to admit
evidence of the ''average speed'' traveled by vehicles in the
area of the accident in view of the testimony showing that the
area in question was posted with 25-mile-an-hour speed limit
signs. It has been held numerous times by this court and
by appellate courts of this state that the question of negligence,
or lack of negligence, is not to be determined by what others
did or did not do at the time and place under the particular
facts and circumstances then and there confronting them,
including the important and undisputed factor here that there
·was a pedestrian in the street. In Rttdd v. Byrnes, 156 Cal.
636, 642 [105 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 26 L.RA.N.S. 134],
it was held that ''The standard of care required of persons
under given circumstances is not to be established by proof
that others have been in the habit of acting in a certain
manner." In Phoenix Assu1·. Co. v. Texas Holding Co., 81
Cal.App. 61, 74-75 [252 P. 1082], it was held "That a mere
custom or usage cannot make due care out of conduct that
is in fact negligence under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence has been stated a number of times by the courts
of this state, as well as of other states . . . . the specific practice
of others cannot be admitted in testimony as an excuse for
the alleged negligent act of the defendant." And in Robinet
v. Hawks, 200 Cal. 265, 274 [252 P. 1045], it was held that
'' . . . the doctrine of customary usage does not, to our knowledge, apply to the question of legal duty under the law of
negligence. In Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn., 172 Cal.
311, 315 [156 Pac. 449], we say: 'We know of no authority
for the proposition that by continuing in a careless performance of duty a party transforms its negligence into due care.
( Silviera v. Iverson, 125 Cal. 266 [57 Pac. 996].) ' '' In
Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal.2d 410, 414 [126 P.2d 345], it was
held: ''Assuming that other manufacturers likewise made no
special examination to discover fractures such a custom would
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these
A somewhat similar
the case of
v. Wa1·man
174 Cal. 556,561 [163 Pac. 885]. In Robinet
v.
Cal.
Pac. 1045], this court said
that the doctrine of
usage does not apply to the
question of legal duty under the law of negligence, or that
the continuance of a c1neless performance of a duty would
transforrn a
into due care.'' In People
v.
5, 16
P. 531], it was held that
" 'The standard of care required of persons under given
circumstances is not to be established by proof that others
have been in the habit of acting in a certain manner.' " See,
also,
v.
130 Cal.App. 475, 482-484 [19 P.2d
1004] ; Car·roll v. Ccntr·al C01mt1:es Gas Co., 96 Cal.App. 161,
165-166 [273 P. 875].
Fowler v.
Tmnsit Lines, 37 Cal.2d 65, 68 [230
P.2d 339], relied upon by a majority of this court to support
the determination that evidence of custom was properly admitted in the case at bar, involved an entirely different situation. There, the court, citing Adamson v. San Francisco,
66 Cal.App. 256 [225 P.
, said: "Where . . . a usual
practice or custom has obtained, and . . . the claim is rnade
that one of the pa1·ties has, to the discomfit~tre of the other,
witho~tt notice, departed fr·orn the 1tsual c1tstmn or practice,
[emphasis added] the courts have by an unbroken line of
decisions held that the qnest·ion of negligence on the part of
the defendant, and the question of contribtdory negligence on
of the pla?:nt?>jf, are both questions for the jury to
the
determine in the light of all of the facts, inclttding the evidence
tend1:ng to establish the allegecl deviation therefrom." In
the Fowler case, it had been alleged that the passenger had
been injured while stepping from a bus which had not stopped
at its customary stopping place. In Ross v. San FranciscoOakland T. R. Co., 47 Cal.App. 753, 766 [191 P. 703], relied
on in the Fowler case, the court said: ''The settled practice
of stopping a street-car at a particular place becomes a rule
of conduct upon which the public has a right to rely to a
reasonable extent, and a departure from such rule is a vitally
important element in determining the question of negligence,
for it constitutes a departure ·from the standard of safety
which the defendant itself has adopted." The majority here
rely upon M1ti1· v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal.App.2d 55 [148 P.2d
138], as it was cited in the Fowler case. The Muir case also
involved a deviation from the normal method of travel on a
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certain portion of highway which was "difficult of description.'' The evidence was offered to show the method in which
most vehicles negotiated a turn on an intersection in the
shape of an arc. It was offered to show the jury the full
set of circumstances surrounding the accident in question.
In support of the rule stated in the Muir case, and restated
by the majority here, several cases are cited but none
of them is in point. For example, in llatzakorzian v. RuckerFuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [239 P. 709, 41 .A.L.R. 1027], a
pedestrian was struck by an automobile driven by an employee
of the defendant. The defendant alleged that the deceased
met his death through his own contributory negligence. No
custom was involved. 'restimony regarding statements made
by the deceased prior to his death 'Nere held admissible so as
to disclose ''that the deceased had in his mind and fully
realized, as he was walking along or over the hig·hway just
before he was struck, the perils or dangers of walking over
the highway in the darlmess of night, and further tended to
show that, while thus engaged, he was exercising due care
for his own safety.'' .Another case is that of Dewees v.
][u.ntz, 130 Cal..App. 620 [20 P.2d 733], where no evidence
of custom was involved. The court there, in explaining the
general rules governing the care to be used by the driver of
an automobile summarized, in part, by saying: "In some
cases the evidence may justify a conclusion that he had actual
knowledge of the danger of collision; in others it may be
concluded from the attendant circumstances that the defendant
>vas advised of the peril, but in a less degree. If it appears
that the defendant omitted to take a precautionary measure
which was prescribed by law or usage, the imputation is that
he must have had knowledge of the danger." In Mace v.
Watanabe, 31 Cal.App.2d 321 [87 P.2d 893], the trial court,
over objection, permitted a traffic officer to testify that it was
the general custom and habit of motorists to travel the roadway along each leg of the "Y" rather than to use the soft
gravel forming the "V" of an intersection. This was offered
to show that each leg of the "Y" constituted a well-traveled
roadway and that the "V" did not constitute such a roadway. It was there said that there was no error in the admission of such testimony since '''I' his evidence was not like
that offered in llurtel v. Albert Cohn,
5 Cal.(2d) 145
152 Pac.(2d) 922], to show the habit of pedestrians to violate
traffic signals maintained for their protection . . . . 'fhe evidence showed that the county had constructed and maintained
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these two separate approaches, and the further evidence that
they were commonly used as such by all motor traffic was
material to respondents' case." In Scott v. Gallot, 59 Cal.
App.2d 421, 426 [138 P.2d 685], it was held that evidence
of custom which was a safety measure was admissible because
it was not evidence of a custom which was negligent.
Here the evidence of custom showed negligence-that of
exceeding the posted speed limit in the area and that evidence
could only have been considered by the jury to excuse any
negligence on the part of the defendant.
The law is well settled that mere custom or usage cannot
make due care out of conduct that is in fact negligence under
circumstances disclosed by the evidence (Phoenix Assur. Co.
v. Texas Holding Co., supra, 81 Cal.App. 61; Rudd v. Byrnes,
supra, 156 Cal. 636; Anstead v. Pacific Gas &: Elec. Co., 203
Cal. 634 [265 P. 487]; Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn., 172
Cal. 311 [156 P. 449]; Robinet v. Hawks, sttpra, 200 Cal.
265; Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., supra, 96 Cal.App.
161; Mehollin v. Ysuchiyama, 11 Cal.2d 53 [77 P.2d 855] ;
Shewarcl v. Virttw, supra, 20 Cal.2c1 410] ; People v. Crossan,
supra, 87 Cal.App. 5; Wolfsen v. Wheeler, supm, 130 Cal.
App. 475; Sanford v. Moreau, 249 App.Div. 915 [292 N.Y.
Supp. 595]; 61 C.J.S. 271).
Plaintiffs' offer of proof that plaintiff wife knew of a
custom of crossing San Fernando Road at the point of the
accident was refused by the trial court. The offer of proof
consisted of this: ''If this witness were allowed to answer,
she will testify that she had been crossing in this same crosswalk area since she first became employed there in 1945, and
when she first came to work there were white lines painted
across the pavement of San Fernando Road; that there have
always been these metal-- There have always been metal
strips across the road; that she, even in company with many
other employees and patrons of the Riverview Laundry had
crossed there; that she had seen many, many persons cross
in that particular area right up to the time of the accident,
and she herself as I say, has crossed there to take the streetcar, as she was doing this morning." While the offer of proof
was somewhat inartistically phrased, the meaning is clear.
Plaintiffs sought to prove that the particular crossing space
had formerly been a marked crosswalk and that since the
San Fernando Road had been resurfaced and the white lines
obliterated, it had by reason of custom become an unmarked
crosswalk. We find in the record that one of defendants'
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instructions told the jury in a negative manner that if a
pedestrian crosses at a point other than within a marked
crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection,
the law requires him to yield the right of way. Stated affirmatively, the :taw requires a motorist to yield the right of
way to a pedestrian crossing within a marked or unmarked
crosswalk. Section 560 (a) of the Vehicle Code provides : ''The
driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian
crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within
any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." Had the evidence been admitted, the jury would have been properly instructed since
the instruction as given was substantially in the language of
the section. Without the evidence, the instruction was meaningless and pointless. The evidence would have shown that by
custom the point in question was an unmarked crosswalk
giving plaintiff wife the right of way. Such evidence was
not only admissible but material to plaintiffs' case. Its exclusion was clearly prejudicial.
I am also of the opinion that the failure to give plaintiffs'
instruction 201-E constituted prejudicial error. It is admitted
in the majority opinion that the requested instruction correctly
states the law; that its subject matter was not covered by
other instructions and that it should have been given. In
the majority opinion, it is then pointed out that the trial
court also failed to give plaintiffs' instruction No. 102-A.
No. 201-E would have told the jury that "While it is the
duty of both the driver of a motor vehicle and a pedestrian,
using a public roadway, to exercise ordinary care, that duty
does not require necessarily the same amount of caution from
each. The driver of a motor vehicle, when ordinarily careful, will be alertly conscious of the fact that he is in charge
of a machine capable of projecting into serious consequences
any negligence of his own. Thus his caution must be adequate
to that responsibility as related to all the surrounding circumstances. A pedestrian, on the other hand, has only his
own physical body to manage and with which to set in motion
a cause of injury. While, usually, that fact limits his capacity to cause injury, as compared with a vehicle driver, still,
in exercising ordinary care, he, too, will be alertly conscious
of the mechanical power acting, or that may act, on the public
roadway, and of the possible serious consequences from any
conflict between himself and such forces. And the caution
required of him is measured by the possibilities of injury

88

CuOINELI.~A

v. \IVESTON Brscurr Co.

[42 C.2d

to him in the conditions at
or that would be
in the same posito a person of
tion." Plaintiffs' instruction No. 102-A would have told the
that ''Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the
ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion to the
danger known to be involved in his undertaking, it follows
that in the exercise of ordinary care the amount of caution
will vary in accordance with the nature of the act
and the surrounding circumstances. 'ro put the matter in
another way, the amount of caution required by law increases
that
should be apprehended.''
as does the
Numerous cases are cited in the majority opinion to the effect
that instruction No. 201-E is a correct statement of the law.
For some
reason, best known only to a majority of
this court, defendant's instruction that ''-While . . . a pedestrian has a right to cross the road at any point . . . the
law requires him to yield the right of way to all vehicles
on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard
. . . [and] the amount of caution required to constitute ordinary care increases as does the danger that a reasonably
prudent person, in like position, would apprehend in the
situation" is quoted. It is then admitted that there has been
a ''seeming'' emphasis placed on the duties of a pedestrian
and that "it is our view" that the court might well have
given plaintiffs' requested No. 102-A "as well as No. 201-E."
But despite these admissions of error and "seeming" favoritism to the defense, it is concluded that no prejudice was
suffered by plaintiffs. Or, at least, not enough error to constitute a miscarriage of justice because a different verdict
"would have been improbable." I say that a different verdict would have been 1nost probable had these errors not
occurred.
In failing to give plaintiffs' two requested instructions and
in giving those requested by defendant, the trial court
·weighted the scales in favor of the defendant by placing a
greater burden of care on a pedestrian than that which the
law imposes and relieved the motorist of the responsibility
which has been imposed on him. Vve are told in the majority
opinion, that ''Although, as mentioned, some of the instructions hereinabove quoted appear to emphasize the duties of a
pedestrian who essays to cross a thoroughfare at a point other
than an intersection or marked crosswalk, such emphasis is at
most a relative matter and is something the appearance of
which cannot always be avoided. The emphasis comes not
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from any rnisstaiernent of the law b1tt
necessarily singling
out the
in order to state accurately and f~tlly the
law applicable to any
ttnder circumstances and in
situations described in the evidence." (Emphasis added.)
There was no
of
out the
Had
plaintiffs' requested instructions
a fair trial would
have been more likely. Had the instructions been given (and
it must be remembered that
they correctly stated
the law and shou.ld have been
the other errors complained of would not have been
so pernicious. Under
the facts of this case, it may
be seen that, first, in
admitting evidence of a so-called custom of evading the law
and exceeding the
limit
which practice plaintiff
wife was supposedly
in effect, told
that plaintiff wife was
at that particular point where all
were
fast. In the
refusal to give her
confusion was compounded
by placing a
of care on
as a pedestrian,
than on the one
a mechanical contrivance capable of
inflicting great bodily mJury. These two errors, added to
the refusal to admit plaintiffs' evidence of a custom of all
pedestrians to cross at an unmarked crosswalk (which had
been previously a marked crosswalk and which was to be,
again, a marked
could have had but one result:
that of impressing upon the
that plaintiff wife had a
tremendous duty of care for her own person in crossing a
highway upon which cars were known to exceed the speed
limit and that in failing to take all these things into consideration she was
of contributory negligence which
proximately caused her injuries. \Ve are told that instructions which "seemed" to emphasize the duties of the operator
of a motor vehicle were
"not to
unfair prominence
to the obligations of the
of a motor vehicle but to
fully and fairly state the law applicable to any vehicle operator in the circumstances and situations described in the evidence. The fault in this case is not one of affirmative misstatement of any rule of law but of failure to explain more
fully that in the
of the general rules of law which
were correctly declared, the
as a matter of law, as well
as factually in using commwn sense, good ju.dgment and genthat the force of inertia of
eral knowledge, should
a heavy, fast moving vehicle is greater than that of a comparatively light and slow moving pedestria.n and that the
respectively ensuing potentialities of harm and devolving re-
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sponsibilities vary accordingly." (Emphasis added.) Error
is admitted; the instructions should have been given; so
prejudice resulted. It is elemental that the jury determines
the facts and renders its verdict ttnder the proper principles
of law. How is a body, composed of laymen untrained in the
law, to make a correct determination and come to the right
conclusion when it has not been ftllly and faiJ·ly instructed as
to the proper principles of law 'I The majority of this court,
whose signatures appear there, would be the first to cry with
horror that a jury must not be allowed, unaided by instructions on the applicable law, to decide which one of two opposing parties was guilty of either negligence or contributory
negligence. In fact, normally, juries are considered so unreliable in their factual determinations that a majority of
this court would substitute itself for those august bodies and
take even the most minute factual determination upon itself.
Yet here, a jury is permitted to make a determination (and
a majority of this court affirms that determination) unaided
by the proper instructions. The result achieved in this case
brings home the truth of the saying that "there ott.ght to be
a closed season on us pedestrians'' !
The discussion in the majority opinion as to the nonprejudicial character of the errors committed by the trial court
in this case is meaningless. Some errors are conceded. The
prejudicial character of any error is purely a matter of
opinion. While the majority does not hold that it was error
to admit evidence of custom as to the speed of automobiles
at the place where the accident occurred or exclude the testimony offered by plaintiff relative to the custom of pedestrians
to cross the street at that point it is conceded that the jury was
erroneously instructed relative to the respective duties and
responsibilities of pedestrians and operators of motor vehicles.
From my examination of the record in this case I do not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that if the errors in
question had not been committed a different result would have
been improbable. On the other hand, I think it highly improbable that the same result would be obtained upon a new
trial free from the errors here shown. For this reason I
believe the errors were prejudicial, and I would therefore
reverse the judgment and direct that a new trial be had.

